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LAW AS A SOCIAL FACT: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR MARTINEZ
Dennis Patterson*
Philosophy's struggle with the concept of truth has been both
protracted and vigorous. Since Plato, one picture of truth-perhaps
the dominant view-has been that truth is a matter of verisimilitude
or convergence of one thing and another. In modernity, truth has
attained its most capacious development in the context of scientific
inquiry. Before Fleck, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, no philosopher had
mounted a serious attack on the idea that scientific truth is a matter
of convergence between a proposition and some state of affairs in
virtue of which the asserted proposition is made true-Realism. Since
the early days of scientific empiricism, the humanistic disciplines have
struggled in the shadow of the natural sciences. One need only recall
the protracted efforts of Freudian psychoanalysts to claim scientific
status for their speculations in order to appreciate the pervasive hold
of the scientific aspiration.
The theoretical struggles between scientists and humanists take
many forms. One persistent debate has been over the nature of the
object of study for each. On the one hand, there are those who, like
myself, believe that the object of the natural sciences is of a funda-
mentally different order than that of art criticism or literature.
George Steiner notes well the distinction between the scientific and
nonscientific disciplines with the observation that in the nonscientific
disciplines, "theories"1 are never falsified, they just fend off the
competition.
Consider Aristotle's theory of -rhetoric. It cannot be said to be
a "theory" in the sense that, say, Copernicus's account of planetary
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law (Camden).
1. See GEORGE STEINER, REAL PRESENCES 72-77 (1989).
Two indispensable criteria must be satisfied by theory: verifiability or
falsifiability by means of experiment and predictive application. There are in art
and poetics no crucial experiments, no litmus-paper tests. There can be no
verifiable or falsifiable deductions entailing predictable consequences in the very
concrete sense in which a scientific theory carries predictive force.
I& at 75.
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motion is a theory. The essential difference between the two is that
scientific theories can be tested in the realm of experiment and their
hypotheses confirmed or not. There is no analog in Aristotle's
account of rhetoric to the scientific hypothesis. Nothing can show
Aristotle's theory of rhetoric to be "false." No evidence can be
marshalled "for" or "against" it. The propositions of Aristotle's
rhetoric are not apt for confirmation in the ways of science.
Against this background, some philosophers have wanted to say
that nonscientific propositions cannot have truth values. 2 Because
scientific propositions assert facts, their truth or falsity depends on
states of affairs in which the asserted propositions are true or false.
Because there are no nonscientific "facts," no nonscientific proposi-
tion can be either true or false. Hence, truth is a concept inappropri-
ate to the nonscientific realm.
This brings us to Professor Martinez's interesting commentary on
recent work in legal theory, including my own, regarding the nature
of truth.3 The specific philosophical question which I consider is
what it means to say that a proposition of law is true. First articulat-
ed by Ronald Dworkin,4 this question asks us what we mean when
we say that a claim about the current state of the law is correct or
incorrect, accurate or inaccurate, true or false. Of course, this
question is one of general philosophical'interest, for it always makes
sense to ask what it means to say that someone is doing something
correctly or not in any field of endeavor, as in painting, finance, or
politics.
Professor Martinez's article is a critical piece: He finds fault with
my account of the nature of truth in law.5 Professor Martinez
correctly states that my work is informed by the approach to the
philosophy taken by Wittgenstein after 1929.6 Having made the
genetic identification, Professor Martinez proceeds to raise questions
about this approach to jurisprudence by adverting to questions raised
by philosophers about the genetic prototype, Wittgenstein's work. In
2. See ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1946).
3. George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence, 29
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 545 (1996).
4. Introduction to THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 5-9 (R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977)
(discussing the idea of "truth" with respect to legal propositions).
5. Martinez, supra note 3, at 572.
6. See generally LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968) (containing a collection of philosophical concepts
Wittgenstein observed over a period of 16 years).
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short, Professor Martinez wants to carry over to jurisprudence general
criticisms of the work of Wittgenstein. I do not think this a very
fruitful way to critique a jurisprudence.
General philosophical objections rarely have a direct and
discernible impact on jurisprudential issues. For example, none of the
objections raised by Professor Robert Fogelin7,to Wittgenstein's later
philosophy has any direct bearing on issues in legal theory. For these
criticisms to have an impact, one must show how they solve a given
problem or answer some question. I do not see Professor Martinez
forging the necessary connections. However, Professor Martinez has
some quite specific criticisms of my approach to the question of truth
in law. It is to these that I wish to respond.
The first of these criticisms concerns the development of what,
following Alasdair MacIntyre,8 Professor Martinez characterizes as
"new conceptual schemes."' The gravamen of Professor Martinez's
argument is that jurisprudence must not limit itself to the description
of our existing justificatory practices, for those very practices have the
effect of marginalizing certain groups and oppressing their members.
In short, it is the task of jurisprudence to "develop perspectives of the
oppressed to infiltrate dominant legal institution[s]. 10
Well, alright. Who could be against liberation of the oppressed?
There is nothing in my work,1 nor the work of any other "New
Wittgensteinian," which argues against liberation of the oppressed.
It is a mistake to see the Wittgensteinian perspective as somehow at
odds with emancipatory projects. In fact, it is perfectly consistent to
be a philosophical Wittgensteinian and a political radical. Indeed, it
probably helps to have a Wittgensteinian perspective on the jurispru-
dential issues, because in order to show that one is truly engaged in
the work of liberation, one first has to give an account of what from
which one is liberated. A jurisprudence which can identify the true
state of the law appears to be just the sort of thing one might wish to
have.
7. See ROBERT J. FOGELIN, WITrOENSTEIN (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 1987) (cited
by Martinez, supra note 3, at 548).
8. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
9. Martinez, supra note 3, at 567.
10. IL at 570.
11. In fact, I argue that feminism can be reconstructive and critical, even from a
postmodern point of view on truth. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminisr/Law, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 254,256-58 (1992).
January 1996]
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We now come to the area of greatest disagreement, that of truth.
In the section of his essay devoted to "Truth," Professor Martinez
quotes me for the proposition that "a proposition of law is true if one
can show that one is correctly using the words in question."' 2 He
further states that, in my view, "there is nothing more to be said
about the truth of a proposition of law than advancing the reasons for
its assertion."' 3 From these quotations, Professor Martinez draws
the conclusion that for me, truth equals justification. 4 It is the
identification of truth with justification that Professor Martinez
contests.
The relationship of truth to justification is a complicated affair.
In traditional terms, truth is a metaphysical relationship and justifica-
tion an epistemic one. For example, I may be justified-in other
words, have good reasons-in believing that my child is at school,
although that belief is false, because, for example, she has skipped
classes to be with her friends. Justification of belief is a matter of
evidence. Truth is a matter of what is the case. Because I do not
employ the concept of justification in the epistemic sense just
described, I do not believe Professor Martinez's critique undermines
any aspect of my position. I hold that the truth of a proposition of
law is shown by the use of forms of argument. Forms of argument
are the culturally-endorsed modes of appraisal for propositions of law.
True, I labeled "justification" the activity of showing the truth of a
proposition of law, but nothing in my work suggests that believ-
ing-an epistemic state-a proposition of law to be true makes it so.
Saying something true requires that, on any given occasion, the
speaker uses the words in question in appropriate ways.5
12. Martinez, supra note 3, at 572 (citing Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the
Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 270,289 (1993) (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991))).
13. Id. (quoting Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward
the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1, 56 (1993)).
14. Ld.
15. This view is expressed by Hilary Putnam, thus:
The suggestion I am making, in short, is that a statement is true of a situation just
in case it would be correct to use the words of which the statement consists in that
way in describing the situation.... [W]e can explain what "correct to use the
words of which the statement consists in that way" means by saying that it means
nothing more nor less than a sufficiently well placed speaker who used the words
in that way would be fully warranted in counting the statement as true of that
situation.
HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 115 (1988).
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Having distinguished between epistemic and metaphysical senses
of justification, and having shown that the sense of justification
relevant for the present discussion is not epistemic but metaphysical,
let me now address the metaphysics of legal justification. This returns
us to a theme broached earlier, that of the distinction between the
natural and the social.
There are two types of facts: natural and social. Natural facts
concern the realm of nature, and are the province of the physical
sciences. Scientific activity seeks understanding of the naturalistic
realm through the twin processes of observation and experiment.
Because law is not a natural fact, observation and experiment have no
role in discerning the state of the law at any given time.
Legal facts are institutional in nature. 6 Owing to the institu-
tional nature of legal affairs, understanding law means understanding
the social practices we identify as legal. Without social practices,
there would be no law. The same is true for all other cultural
products, such as money, art, or beauty.1
7
Professor Martinez takes issue with my account of the nature of
law by contrasting it with a certain picture of the development of law.
He states:
The justification conditions for sentences change as our total
body of knowledge changes. Thus, not only may we
discover that statements we now regard as justified are false,
but we may even discover that procedures we now regard as
justificatory are not, and that different justification proce-
dures are better.'8
For the reasons given, I think this view of the nature of law is
false. Legal facts-what is the case as a matter of law-are not
"discovered." Cures for diseases are discovered through the inter-
vention of the creative scientist. But there are no contracts in the
world in the same way there is cancer. The fact that there is cancer
in the world depends not at all on us. By contrast, there would be no
contracts in the world without the social practice we identify as
contract law.
16. For a development of this claim in the context of commercial law, see Dennis M.
Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and
Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 335 (1988).
17. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCrION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995) (providing
a recent treatment of this topic).
18. Martinez, supra note 3, at 572 (citing PUTNAM, supra note 14, at 85).
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Nothing in this account of the nature of law undermines the
possibility of legal facts or the objectivity of law. Rather, it seeks to
show that the nature of law is of an order fundamentally different
from that of the physical world. For that reason, any account of it
must itself be of a different order.
It is always difficult in the space of a short reply to be as
complete as one might like in responding to criticism. I believe that
one obstacle to fruitful debate over the issues that divide Professor
Martinez and myself is the lack of a clear consensus as to what the
disagreement is about. In my theoretical work, 9 I have pressed the
case against a certain conception of truth in law, one imported from
the natural sciences. I believe Professor Martinez relies on this
conception in criticizing my position. I hope I have shown why this
criticism misses its intended target.
19. A complete statement of my views is found in my forthcoming book Law and
Truth (Oxford University Press, 1996).
[Vol. 29:579
